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INTRODUCTION

In the last generation, politics has replaced philosophy as constitutional theory's center of gravity. While theorists once focused on judicial
authority and looked to philosophy to validate the principles of justice that
judges enforced, they now tend to consider how judges fit into the broader
political process that defines constitutional doctrine. This essay considers
how the change obscures important questions about the nature of democratic government. It does so by examining Sanford Levinson's recent book,
Our Undemocratic Constitution.'
At first glance, Levinson's book would appear to be an odd choice. He
is not interested in constitutional doctrine or how it came to be. 2 He brackets issues that have tended to dominate debates in constitutional theory,
issues such as whether women have a right to choose to have abortions.3
Levinson, instead, calls for a constitutional convention to consider amendments that would eliminate structural flaws in American constitutional de*
University;
1.
2.
3.

Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas State University. B.A., Drew
J.D., Yale University; Ph.D., Columbia.
SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006).
Id.
at 5.
at 23.
Id.
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sign, flaws that explain why American constitutionalism fails to satisfy a
common-sense understanding of democratic government.4 In so doing, he
makes his case to the people themselves. 5 It is this attempt to bridge academic theory to the practice of politics that is emblematic of constitutional
theory's emphasis of politics over philosophy.
Levinson follows a path that the political theorist Michael Walzer suggested a quarter of a century ago. 6 Walzer argued that philosophical conclusions about justice have no special authority in democratic politics and that
philosophers, like other citizens, must expose their conclusions to the give
and take of democratic discussion and be willing to adapt their arguments to
address the concerns of their fellow citizens and to respect a shared history.7 However, Levinson must avoid certain normative questions in order
to persuade people to heed his call for constitutional reform.8
This is not surprising. Politics can intrude on philosophy just as philosophy can intrude on politics. 9 Walzer wrote at a time when law professors turned to the judiciary to enforce philosophical conceptions of justice,
and this is why he emphasizes the problem of philosophy intruding on politics.1 ° Nonetheless, he recognizes that philosophical engagement demands
that philosophers separate themselves from their community so that their
deliberations about justice are not distorted by the practices and conventions of the politics they experience."1
Levinson writes as a citizen who seeks to forge a consensus for constitutional change appropriate for people who share his experience of American constitutional democracy.' 2 The perspective of citizenship is much narrower than that of philosophy; while philosophers might ask what the best
institutional arrangement is, citizens must seek the best arrangement for
leaves important
people who do things the way they do.' 3 And Levinson
14
normative questions unanswered for political reasons.
Moreover, many constitutional theorists now write from a similar perspective, even those who write for a scholarly audience and address questions of judicial authority that have dominated traditional debates. 1 5 And
this perspective has great significance for how they view these questions.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 3-11,167-80.
Michael Walzer, Philosophyand Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379 (1981).
Id. at 396.
See infra text accompanying notes 79-103.
See Walzer, supra note 6, at 383.
ld at 387-88.
Id. at 380.
See LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 3-9.
See Walzer, supra note 6, at 383.
See infra text accompanying notes 80-102.
See infra text accompanying notes 104-11.
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Indeed, as judicial intrusions into politics have become part of a conventional understanding of American constitutional democracy, many theorists
now assume the legitimacy
of these intrusions without grappling with
16
broader normative issues.
II.

FROM PHILOSOPHY TO POLITICS

As political philosophy was enjoying a renewed ascendance, Walzer
argued against those who would have judges intervene in democratic politics to advance philosophical truths claiming universal validity.1 He
claimed that political authority in a democracy follows from the particular
8
understandings and conventions of members of the actual community.'
Law professors' turn to philosophy, however, was animated by the
quest to solve the countermajoritarian difficulty, a problem that invited philosophical solution.19 And their subsequent 2turn
to politics reflects constitu0
tional theory's failure to solve this problem.
A.

THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY AND ITS AFTERMATH

The countermajoritarian difficulty associates judicial authority with
the principles that judges enforce.2 ' More particularly, theorists believe that
judicial review undercuts two bases of democratic legitimacy. Elected institutions (1) define values that better reflect the will of citizens, and (2) allow
citizens to control their government.22 Constitutional theorists sought to
ground judicial authority in legal principles that could overcome these con16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra text accompanying notes 112-35.
See Walzer, supra note 6, at 379, 387-91.
Id. at 396-97.

See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 2-3, 16-23 (1962).

20.
See Kenneth Ward, The Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty and Legal Realist
Perspectives of Law: The Place of Law in ContemporaryConstitutional Theory, 18 J.L. &
POL. 851, 854-60 (2002).
21.
Id. The quest to solve the countermajoritarian difficulty was an attempt to identify a theory of constitutional interpretation that would allow people to consider these conflicts as settled by a pre-existing law. Although the problem is associated with Bickel, debates in constitutional theory took a path that Bickel warned against. Bickel recognizes that
judicial review needs special justification, because judges enforce disputed interpretations of
constitutional law. Indeed, he criticizes John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison for
framing the question of judicial review to emphasize its legal aspects (judges enforcing preexisting legal norms) and for ignoring the political reality of judges defining the norms they
enforce. BICKEL, supra note 19, at 2-4 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803)). This is what Bickel means when he says that Marshall's opinion not only begs the
question, it begs the wrong question. Id. at 2.
22.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT 1, 101-04 (1980). Ely frames what
I have called the conventional view of the countermajoritarian difficulty. Id.; see also Ward,
supra note 20, at 854-60.
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cerns. 23 They identified principles that had broad normative appeal, principles that should trump decisions of elected institutions. 24 They also sought
principles that had sufficient objectivity to limit judicial discretion such that
people could believe that those principles, rather than the political preferences of judges, were the basis of judicial decisions.25
We can see why constitutional theorists would mine political philosophy as a source of authoritative principles. Political philosophers made
claims of moral truth to resolve questions of justice.26 As a consequence,
their arguments had the elements of normativity and objectivity that this
framework demanded.27
The quest to solve the countermajoritarian difficulty failed, however.28
Disagreements about justice made it impossible for theorists to identify
principles that had broad normative appeal and that retained this appeal
when defined at a level of abstraction necessary to constrain judicial discretion.2 9 Principles that have broad appeal in the abstract lose that appeal
when applied to concrete legal issues.30 People, for example, do not agree
whether principles of equality justify or work counter to affirmative action
programs, or on how to resolve conflicts among these principles, such as

23.
See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS (1970); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLmCAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW (1990); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1977); Thomas

C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975); Michael J.
Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American
Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191 (1978); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States FederalCourts in Interpreting the Constitutionand Laws,
in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973); J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel,
the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L. REv. 769 (1971). In seeking
solutions to the countermajoritarian difficulty, theorists looked to reason, nature, and tradition to find authoritative legal principles. They also defended principles that they claimed
were supported by popular consensus and sought consensus in the political community's
past, present, and perhaps even its future. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 22, at 69-70. Ely interprets Bickel as making such an argument, though Ely's interpretation is not consistent with
my reading of Bickel's view of the countermajoritarian difficulty. ELY, supra note 22, at 6970.
24.
See ELY, supra note 22, at 60-69.
25.
Id. at 43-72.
26. See DWORKIN, supra note 23.
27.
See Walzer, supra note 6, at 383.
28.
See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
29.

MARK TUSHNET,

RED,

WHITE,

AND BLUE:

A CRIICAL ANALYSIS OF

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).
30.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
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whether principles of free speech extend to communications that subordinate others.31
Consider John Hart Ely's critique of nonoriginalist-what he calls
noninterpretivist-theories of judicial review.32 He uses the play between
abstract principles and their concrete application to illustrate that these
theories do not identify an acceptable source of values that will limit judicial discretion. 33 Indeed, his book became a model for criticizing arguments
that claimed to solve the countermajoritarian difficulty, a model that is subsequently used against Ely's own argument, that judges should enforce certain core procedural principles that define American democracy.3
As theorists moved beyond the countermajoritarian difficulty, scholarly attention shifted from principles of justice that are outside of the democratic political process, and scholars paid greater attention to the process
that resolved disagreements about justice.35 Ely's argument suggests this
transition, but it does not characterize his own work. Although he contends
that judges contribute to democratic government, Ely does not argue that
judges participate in the democratic political process that defines constitutional values. They, instead, enforce principles that are external to both the
judicial process and the political process.
By contrast, many constitutional theorists today have moved beyond
the question of whether judges have special authority that justifies their

31.
See ELY, supra note 22, at 60-69.
32.
See ELY, supra note 22. I follow Paul Brest in using the term "nonoriginalist" in
order to avoid the mistaken impression that noninterpretivists do not interpret the text of the
Constitution and to achieve clarity given that the primary critics of nonoriginalist judicial
review call themselves originalists. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original
Understanding,60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1979).
33.
ELY, supra note 22, at 11-42.
34.
ELY, supra note 22, at 101-04. Ely's critics note that Ely does not define his
conception of democracy at a level of abstraction necessary to limit judicial discretion and
that judges' concerns for doctrinal outcomes will inevitably determine the principles that
they believe constitute American democracy. See generally STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTIONALISM 160 (1996); PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY 149-50 (1992);
ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 173-74 (1985);
TUSHNEr, supra note 29, at 94-107; Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of ProcessBased ConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
35.
See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984);
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001); RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL
VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990);
TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999); MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE

THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1999); Louis
MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTrrIUTION (2001); Gerald F. Gaus, Public Reason
and the Rule of Law, in NoMos XXXVI: THE RULE OF LAW 328 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).

36.

See ELY, supra note 22, at 101-04.
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intervention in democratic politics. 37 They conceive of the judiciary as a
political institution, one that complements elected institutions within the
broader democratic process that defines principles of justice.38
More significantly, constitutional theorists now tend to consider judicial authority a component of an institutional arrangement that purports to
represent the authority of the American people. Some theorists, for example, defend conceptions of popular constitutionalism in which the American
people resolve disagreements about justice. 39 These theorists consider the
authority of judicial interpretations of constitutional law relative to those of
elected officials and other political actors, or argue that judges should be
excluded from democratic politics altogether.4 ° Others focus on how judges
can decide cases in a manner that makes the political process work better.4
B.

LEVINSON AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY'S TURN TO POLITICS

These changes suggest that politics has displaced philosophy as constitutional theory's center of gravity, and Levinson's book is emblematic of
the change. First, rather than address particular issues of constitutional interpretation, he considers questions of constitutional structure, namely what
it means for political institutions to be well ordered.4 2 Levinson points to
structural features of the Constitution that work contrary to a commonsense view of democratic government.43
Second, Levinson's argument focuses on the American people, rather
than the Court or its decisions. 44 He assumes that political authority follows
37.
See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, ConstitutionalTheory and the Faces of Power,
in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 163-65 (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R.
Castillo eds., 2005).
ELY, supra note 22, at 101-04.
38.

39. See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONsTITUTION 217
(2004); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 58 (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING
THE CONSTIrTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
See sources cited supra note 39.
See generally ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTTruTION IN CONFLICT (1992);
SEIDMAN, supra note 35; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999). As the American
people have taken on greater significance, we have seen an increase in scholarship aimed at
an audience wider than that sought by earlier generations of constitutional theorists. Perhaps
we should not be surprised that scholars who address the critical issues of the day would
seek the greater influence that comes with a wider audience, but it is surprising when their
arguments address esoteric questions concerning the role of judicial authority and the nature
of American democracy. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992);
SEIDMAN, supra note 35; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999); see also BORK,
40.
41.

DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 39; JEFFERY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC
BRANCH (2006); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY (2001).

supra note 23;
42.

43.
44.

LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 5-6.

Id. at 11-24.
Id. at 3-24.
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from people acting through political institutions and not from institutional
decisions that advance a correct view of justice.45 As a consequence, his
argument is designed to gain the support of the people themselves, who he
assumes have authority to answer foundational questions of political structure, and is less concerned with identifying the best institutional arrangement or the one most likely to secure justice.
Levinson contends that American political institutions fail to represent
people equally and yield policies that do not address the needs of the majority of citizens. 46 He identifies various structural features that ensure that
some citizens will receive more representation than others.47 The Senate, he
notes, is apportioned such that the citizens of Wyoming enjoy the same
representation as the citizens of California, even though California has seventy times the population. 48 Citizens of smaller states, therefore, enjoy better access to senators, an advantage that is magnified because small states
tend to have less diverse populations. 49 As a consequence, senators of small
states are more likely than their big state colleagues to be responsive to
constituents and, having fewer interests to represent, are well situated to
achieve leadership positions50 that strengthen the position from which they
represent these constituents.
Similarly, Levinson notes that the Electoral College undercuts ideals
of equal representation. 5 1 Candidates can win the presidency without gaining a majority, or even a plurality, of the popular vote, and nonpopulous
states enjoy greater influence in the Electoral College than their more populous counterparts. 52 It also creates incentives for candidates to focus on battleground states, particularly those that are rich in delegates.53 Therefore,
campaigns direct resources at citizens who live in these states, and those
citizens are 4in a position to have greater influence on agendas of different
campaigns.

Levinson also associates these institutional features with the failure of
American democracy to serve the interests of the majority of citizens.55 He
discusses how powerful senators direct disproportionate sums to their constituents and how numerical minorities advance their interests by exploiting
the many veto points of the legislative process, and thereby prevent the
45.
46.
47.

M atll.
Id. at 29, 38, 49.
Id. at 25-79.

54.
55.

LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 88-89.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 29.
Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 55-62.
Id. at 81-97.
Id. at 87, 89-90.
Id. at 87-89.
d. at9.
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passing of important legislation that can serve the public weal. 56 He identifies policies that clearly favor minority over majority interests or a clear,
common good, policies such as the Alaskan bridge to nowhere or the inequitable division of dollars earmarked for homeland security.5 7
Levinson is most persuasive in citing ample evidence that the American people do not like their government.58 He cites statistics that indicate
people's dissatisfaction with government and each institution of government in particular. 59 His argument amounts to the claim that "[e]ven if no
two persons can necessarily be expected to agree on what kind of change is
desirable, it should be relatively easy these days to find a wide range
of
' 6°
agreement that the American system is impervious to needed changes.
It is here that the connection to Walzer is most apparent. Levinson
treads where he finds consensus. People can embrace his structural argument regardless of their interests and most ideological positions, and this
allows Levinson to respect people's self-understanding, as it relates both to
important
interests and, particularly, to their sense of sharing a distinct his1
tory.

6

Levinson adroitly anticipates readers who might question his motives
or might suspect that he hides the ideological implications of his argument.
Indeed, by acknowledging his own ideological preferences, Levinson deflates skepticism that would otherwise distract readers or, more likely,
would lead them to dismiss the book outright. 62 Moreover, he supports his
argument with examples that are decidedly bipartisan. To illustrate deficiencies in the Electoral College, he pairs Nixon's defeat in the 1960 election with Gore's defeat in 2000.63 He notes that the filibuster has grounded
the agenda of President Bush as well as of President Clinton and that the
64
President's veto has thwarted both Republican and Democrat Congresses.
Levinson, then, is careful to avoid the impression that he is a partisan
pitchman who wants to trick readers into believing something they do not
believe. But the book's rhetorical power follows from the respect he shows
his audience, respect made clear by his willingness to address them as
equals and, what is more, to see himself as one with his audience. 65 And
though Levinson is provocative, he takes seriously people's fundamental
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 35-36, 56-58.
ld. at 56-57.
Id. at 7-9.
Id.
LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 38.
Id. at 16-20, 29, 38,49.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 82-83.
Id. at41.
Id. at 3-11.
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beliefs, including, perhaps especially, their love of country. 66 He embraces
a common history through appeals to political ideals set out in the Constitution's preamble and conspicuous cites to founders as authority for his argument. 67 His respect for our constitutional heritage eliminates distance
with his readers, allowing him to speak about the implications of principles
that are genuinely shared.
Levinson's book stands out as an act of constitutional politics, taking
to heart Walzer's injunction that the philosopher who ventures into democratic politics must
address the concerns of his fellow citizens, try to answer
their questions, [and] weave his arguments into the fabric
of their history. He must, indeed, make himself a fellow
citizen in the community of ideas, and then he will be unable to avoid entirely the moral and even the emotional entanglements of citizenship. He may hold fast to the philosophical truths of natural law, distributive justice, or human rights, but his political arguments are most likely to
look like some makeshift version of those truths, adapted to
the needs of a particular people .... 6 8
Rather than assert the validity of philosophical conclusions, Levinson
forges a compromise that is responsive to other citizens' views, a compromise recognizing that citizens enjoy equal authority to define the institu69
tional arrangements that govern them.
The remainder of this essay considers consequences that this political
perspective has for normative debates in constitutional theory. With the
shift to politics, the people replace the Court as both the object and subject
of constitutional theory. In general terms, constitutional theorists assume
that political authority rests with the people and seek to influence how people might exercise it or describe how political institutions represent the
people's will.
This creates at least two problems for normative discussion. The first
follows when theorists jump into politics and attempt to influence the people themselves. Levinson argues for structural changes that will bring
American constitutionalism into line with ideals of democracy, but he does
not address adequately the question of what makes a government democratic. 70 To do so would undermine his political goal-forging a consensus
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 167-80.

Id. at 4, 9, 12-13, 16-19, 34-35, 62, 66, 104, 116, 131, 133, 175.
Walzer, supra note 6, at 396.
LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 3-9.
See infra text accompanying notes 80-112.
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for institutional reform. Levinson, thus, brackets two kinds of normative
questions. He focuses on structure in order to temper controversies associated with issues of constitutional interpretation and the questions of justice
that inform them. 7 1 But his structural argument also brackets higher order

normative claims about the nature of democracy, claims that are as controversial as the substantive claims of justice that he tries to avoid.72
Given that Levinson's book is primarily an act of constitutional politics rather than a work of constitutional theory, we should not be surprised
that he skirts normative issues for reasons of political expediency. Indeed,
this is what Walzer suggested he must do if he is to influence his fellow
citizens.73
It is a more serious problem, however, when debates in constitutional
theory fail to address these normative issues adequately, and this is the second problem to be considered. Constitutional theorists assess different institutional arrangements in order to identify the best ones. Although they
might like to have the people act on their conclusions,7 4 it is more important
that their conclusions be valid. This is less likely when they write from an
internal perspective.7 5
Consider Walzer's argument itself. Rather than attempt to convince
people of the need for institutional reforms that would impede judicial intervention in democratic politics, he assesses the conflict between philosophy and democracy from a philosophical perspective. He detaches himself
from the practices of the community in order to increase the likelihood that
his conclusions will be valid, even though the community might reject
these
76
conclusions and, according to Walzer, have the authority to do SO.
By contrast, many constitutional theorists now consider judicial authority from a perspective inside the political community. They tend to take
it as a given that American political institutions represent the authority of
the people and, as a consequence, do not address what it means to represent
the will of the people or, more generally, what is the best institutional arrangement to secure the ends of democratic government. More particularly,
judicial supremacy is now widely thought to be a characteristic of American democracy, and it has gained legitimacy as an aspect of constitutional
politics, even though people have never consented to the practice and
though it is not at all clear that they should. 77 The question of whether judi71.
72.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See supra text accompanying notes 43-69.
See Walzer, supra note 6, at 386.

Id. at 396.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 387.
See infra text accompanying notes 112-33.
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cial supremacy is justified looks very different from an external perspective.78
LI.
A.

NORMATIVE DISCUSSION AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY'S
TURN TO POLITICS

LEVINSON'S NORMATIVE DISCUSSION

We have seen that Levinson's structural argument associates institutional flaws with political outcomes that run counter to a reasonable person's understanding of democratic government. 79 His argument is deceptive, however, because people can agree that certain outcomes offend norms
of democratic government without agreeing about what it means for a government to be democratic. 80 Indeed, Levinson secures consensus by avoiding controversial questions about the nature of democratic government. 8'
Levinson, for example, asserts that the constitutional convention has
authority to resolve conflicts about democracy without telling us why. 82 He
suggests that the convention will be intensely deliberative and that its decio ics
ede
83
sions will be determined by majority vote. He, however, does not discuss
84
the conditions for a discussion that is adequately deliberative; nor does he
explain the voting rules that are necessary for us to consider a majority vote
as authoritative and why a majority vote is sufficient compared to other
voting rules. To do so is beyond the scope of his project; Levinson seeks to
inspire political 85action, not to validate a particular conception of deliberative democracy.

78. See infra text accompanying notes 134-41.
See supra text accompanying notes 43-70.
79.
See supra note 35.
80.
Levinson conflates two questions: (1) what it means for institutions to represent
81.
the authority of the people such that we can take seriously the claim that they express the
public's will, and (2) how to adjudicate conflicts about the meaning of democracy. He believes that the American people should resolve conflicts about the meaning of democracy
and will do so at the constitutional convention, as the convention speaks with the authority
of the people. LEVINSON, supra note 1.
82.
Id. at 172-78.
Id.
83.
See Ilya Somin & Neal Devins, Can We Make the Constitution More Democ84.
ratic?,55 DRAKE L. REV. 971 (2007).
We can see that Levinson pursues political change as an insider working within
85.
the rules established by the Constitution. In fact, he treats the Constitution as legal authority
where it applies directly to his political purpose. Indeed, this is one of the few places in the
book where an issue of constitutional interpretation arises: Levinson argues that we can
amend the Constitution through a process that seems to vary from the text of Article V.
LEVINSON, supra note 1. at 173-75.
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Though Levinson's structural argument gives us some sense of his
conception of democracy, it too is vague. We have seen that he favors an
institutional arrangement that represents people equally and that advances
important interests. 86 But his argument is negative; it identifies particular
pathologies that follow from the Constitution's institutional design. This
negative focus helps Levinson to avoid both abstract questions of what it
means to represent people equally and more concrete questions about what
institutions must do to represent people adequately.
For example, while we know the Senate violates norms of equal representation, we never gain a clear sense of what equal representation entails
or the type of institutional arrangement that would secure it. And while
Levinson believes that the elimination of veto points would increase the
likelihood Congress will pass "wonderful" legislation,87 we do not know the
types of interests that would be advanced by such legislation or what it
means for legislation to advance the common good.88
These omissions become important when we consider that many people do not share Levinson's optimism that more legislation might lead to
wonderful legislation. They would favor impediments to legislation to ensure that laws have broad-based support, the kind of democracy Levinson
rejects. 89 Conservatives, for example, would believe that by broadening the
coalition necessary to legislate, we militate against rash and poorly conceived change. 90 Or they might simply want to reduce the volatility of government and to secure the benefits of a more predictable and consistent legislative scheme. 91
This conservative critique of majoritarianism is both structural and
substantive. Conservatives would favor institutions that promote stability
and work against imprudent legislation. They also would associate impru86. See supra text accompanying notes 43-70.
87.
LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 36.
88.
Consider again Levinson's discussion of the constitutional convention that will
answer such questions. He is confident that adequate deliberation will ensure that the convention protects fundamental constitutional rights, but he does nothing more than name the
rights that should be protected without saying what it means to do so or how to weigh them
against other rights or against commitments to order and security. Indeed, we have seen that
these are questions Levinson must bracket if he is to sustain consensus for his critique. Id. at
175.
89. Id. at 33-34, 37. It is more accurate to say that Levinson believes that American
constitutionalism has failed to attain the kind of consensus-based democracy that its proponents defend.
90.
GEORGE W. CAREY, THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC
(1994).
91.
See id.; MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, ON HUMAN CONDUCT (1975); Antonin Scalia,
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in
Interpretingthe Constitutionand Laws, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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dent legislation with particular governmental actions. It is not a stretch to
think that the legislation Levinson favors will involve government intrusions in civic or private life that come into conflict with principles of constitutional justice that many conservatives endorse. 92 Similarly, libertarians
would have reason to favor consensus-based democracy if they thought that
it would lead to a smaller government and, thus, create a broader scope for
the liberties that define their own view of constitutional justice.93
Moreover, Levinson's argument loses rhetorical punch when we consider particular pathologies he identifies in light of more abstract considerations of democratic government. While something seems wrong when elections do not secure changes that voters sought or presidents assume office
having received fewer votes than their opponents, these problems take on a
different cast if we are committed to governing by consensus. Lame-duck
presidencies and congresses impede changes that might not be fully thought
out or that have been unduly influenced by the short-term conditions that
sometimes determine the outcome of a single election, or even an election
cycle. They also reinforce the lesson that what unites Americans runs
deeper than the preferences expressed through institutions that purport to
represent them at any particular point in time. 94
Similarly, the Electoral College seems to fail when the country is divided, and especially when it is equally divided, as was the case in Kennedy's victory over Nixon and Bush's victory over Gore.95 But a tainted
outcome would seem a better measure of the election than the false suggestion of a clear-cut winner. More significantly, such an outcome poses an
impediment to those who would translate a victory into a call for action in
the name of a very narrow agenda.96 And again, the Electoral College reinforces the lesson that the presidency is part of an institutional arrangement

92. See, e.g., JONAH GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM (2007); BARRY GOLDWATER, THE
CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE (1960).
93.
See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); RICHARD EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE

CONSTITUTION (2006); 3 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE
POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1978).

94.
95.

1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3-34 (1991).
LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 89, 92-93.
96. The Bush presidency seems to provide contrary evidence, but President Bush's
success in advancing a very narrow agenda is tied to the unusual circumstance of the September 11th attack. Indeed, prior to this attack, a comparison to administrations that were
elected in similar historical circumstances would lead one to predict that the Bush administration would be ineffectual. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993).
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not just the majority that happens to
that is supposed to represent everyone,
97
coalesce at a particular point in time.
This is not to say that we should reject Levinson's proposal or favor a
consensus-based conception of democracy over the majoritarian democracy
that informs Levinson's structural argument. We can see, however, that
Levinson fails to adequately address the normative considerations that underlie the different conceptions. Instead, he suggests that the rise of partisan
political parties has made it so that American political institutions do not
advance the ends of either conception of democracy. 98 But he does not address the point in much detail. His argument seems to depend almost entirely on the success of the Bush administration in concentrating power,
notwithstanding its threadbare political majority. 99 And his analysis does
not give adequate account to the role that September lth might have
played in President Bush's success or to the difficulties faced by the Bush
administration once the attacks began to recede and ordinary politics began
to return. 100

More significantly, even if we were to accept Levinson's assertion that
the rise of partisan parties works against consensus-based democracy, we
still must decide how to reform American constitutionalism, whether to
design institutions better suited for consensus-based democracy or to pursue
majoritarian democracy. Levinson's negative argument emphasizes people's dislike of the American democracy without addressing the normative
considerations that should inform this choice. We have seen that such an
argument would expose deeper disagreements about what democracy
should be and, thus, would work against his political goal-building consensus in favor of constitutional change.10
Levinson's book is extraordinary in the relish with which it pursues
changes that go to the foundations of our political system. But absent the
kind of cataclysmic event that makes foundational political change possible,
people's perceptions of their interests and fear of change, in all likelihood,
will prevent agreement beyond the conclusion that American democracy is
far from perfect.10 2

97.

JAMES W.

CEASAR,

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION:

THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT

(1979); RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE PRESIDENTIAL GAME: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
PRESIDENTIAL POLmcs 7, 16-27 (1982).

LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 33, 63-69, 77.
Id. at 33.
100.
See Kenneth D. Ward, The Fog of War: Checks and Balances and National
Security Policy, 67 MD. L. REV. 36 (2007).
101.
See supra text accompanying notes 80-100; infra text accompanying notes 10213.
102.
See, e.g., R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL'Y
371, 373-74, 394-95 (1986).
98.

99.
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Indeed, structural changes of the kind that Levinson seeks are more
likely to be secured by the operation of the ordinary political process rather
than by constitutional amendment of the Article V variety or similar proc10 3
ess that can claim with plausibility to speak in the name of the people.
Therefore, if ordinary political processes do not speak with the authority of
the people, as Levinson contends, it would seem important that constitutional theorists assess institutional changes from a perspective that is external to the process that makes those changes. The next section illustrates
how an internal perspective would impede a normative assessment of such
changes.
B.

THE INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE IN CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY

Debates in contemporary constitutional theory reflect the change in
orientation we have associated with the shift from philosophy to politics.
Many theorists now focus on structural questions. 1°4 They address how institutional arrangements represent the authority of the people rather than
how judges should interpret the Constitution for their decisions to be le10 5
gitimate.
What is most striking, perhaps, is how the debate about judicial review
changes when our perspective shifts from philosophy to politics. In favoring democracy over philosophy, Walzer considered the conflict from a philosophical perspective-a perspective outside of the political community."°6
One would expect that, as a citizen, he would favor institutional reforms to impede judges who would intervene in democratic politics to vindicate principles of justice. But judicial review in this form appears consistent with a conventional understanding of how American democracy operates and when viewed from an internal perspective, seems to gain authority
07
as a component of a political process that is itself legitimate.
Many theorists seem to find judicial review legitimate given its contribution to American democracy. Some theorists, for example, describe how
judges represent interests that would otherwise go unrepresented within our
institutional structure or identify institutional features that explain why ju103.
See generally KErrH E. WHITINGTON, CONSTmIONAL CONSTRUCTION:
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999).
104.
See Kenneth D. Ward, Bickel and the New Proceduralists,in THE JUDICIARY
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 163-65 (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 2005).
105.
See supra notes 36, 39, 44.
106.
See William A. Galston, Community, Democracy, Philosophy: The Political
Thought of Michael Walzer, 17 POL. THEORY 119, 127 (1989).
107.
Id. at 129; see also DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 39; ROSEN, supra note 41;
Friedman, supra note 28.
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dicial decisions do not stray far from the opinions of the majority.108 Others
describe how judges have advanced our deliberation about constitutional
have encouraged greater deliberation by decidvalues or how judges10might
9
differently.
ing cases
But these theorists are not interested in abstract questions of what it
means for a government to be adequately deliberative or representative, or
in comparing how different institutional arrangements might manifest the
virtues of deliberation or representation. Much as Levinson assumed any
action that arose from a constitutional convention would be legitimate, this
work tends to situate the interactions of judges and elected officials within a
broader political process that has, what is assumed to be, legitimate authority to speak for the people. Therefore, rather than compare an institutional
arrangement with judicial review to alternatives that might advance different normative commitments or consider whether an alternative arrangement
might secure a superior form of democracy, these theorists describe how, in
practice, American constitutionalism advances or might advance norms that
they associate with democracy. n 0 Such comparisons become more important when we consider that the current practice of judicial review is not
established by the Constitution and is instead a construction of political
institutions that purport to speak in the name of the people."'
Consider the question of judicial supremacy, a question that has gained
prominence in recent debates." 2 In general terms, the question of judicial
supremacy goes to the status of conflicting interpretations of the Constitution, to wit, whether judges or elected institutions should have final say
108.

See Galston, supra note 106, at 29; see also DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 39;

PERETTI, supra note 35; ROSEN, supra note 41; Friedman, supra note 28; Barry Friedman,

William Howard Taft Lecture: The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function
of JudicialReview, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 1257, 1291, 1297-98 (2004).
See sources cited supra note 40; see also MACEDO, supra note 35; Friedman,
109.
supra note 28.
The same is true of theorists who argue against judicial review or seek to curtail
110.
its exercise but do so from an internal perspective. Mark Tushnet, for example, attempts to
persuade people that judicial review does not advance good interests in comparison to those
that would be advanced if questions of constitutional meaning were left entirely within the
purview of elected officials. Consider as well the Duke colloquium that considered term
limits for Supreme Court Justices. Many of the contributors assumed that judges decide
cases to advance political preferences and, rather than consider whether an institutional
structure that impeded such judging would better reflect democratic ideals, they proposed
institutional reforms that would recalibrate the Court to bring it closer to the electoral cycle.
See TUSHNET, supra note 39. See generally REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006).
See WHITTINGTON, supra note 103.
111.
See, e.g., DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 39; KRAMER, supra note 39; THAT
112.
EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christopher Wolfe ed.,
2004); KEITH E. WHITrINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2007).
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about what the Constitution means." 3 The people of the United States have
never considered and expressed their consent to judicial supremacy through
either formal or informal political process. 1 4 But from an internal perspective it seems to gain authority as part of a conventional understanding of
American democracy.
Keith Whittington, for example, describes how judicial supremacy
came to characterize our politics."

5

He contends that the Constitution

leaves open the question of which institution has authority to resolve disagreements about its meaning and that this question is contested as people
pursue particular disagreements about constitutional meaning.11 6 In this
view, the abortion debate is both an argument about whether the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a woman's right to choose and an argument about
who ultimately resolves the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment
protects this right.
Whittington associates the rise of judicial supremacy with elected officials acting in their own self-interest. 1 7 These officials expand judicial authority in order to enforce the commitments of the dominant political regime against the interests opposed to the regime, most typically regional or
local interests, such as when New Dealers relied on judges to define and
enforce their commitment to civil rights."18 This strengthens judges' positions to resolve intramural conflicts among political actors when they disagree about the meaning of the regime to which they are affiliated, because
those disagreements both dilute the authority that could be used against the
judges and ensure that judges would find allies to support controversial
rulings.1 9 Judicial supremacy, in Whittington's view, describes the circumstances in which judges will tend to prevail in the contest to determine constitutional meaning; it is
not a claim about the nature of judicial authority
20
under the Constitution.'

113.
Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial ConstitutionalInterpretation:Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REv. 773, 783-86 (2002). Whittington follows the tendency
among constitutional theorists to frame the problem in terms of how much deference elected
officials owe to judicial decisions. Id. at 773. And as he notes, the debate focuses on the
question of who settles the question when institutions disagree about what the Constitution
means. See generally WHinTINGTON, supra note 103. I use judicial supremacy to characterize
the political environment in which institutions advance competing interpretations. See Kenneth D. Ward, Against Judicial Supremacy, Legislative Overrides as a Check on Judicial
Review (Jan. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
114.
For a discussion of informal constitutional amendments, see 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See WHITHNGTON, supra note 112.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 254-84.
Id. at 105-24.
Id. at24.
Id. at 25-27.
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Nonetheless, Whittington finds virtue in judicial supremacy.,2 He
suggests that judicial supremacy adds nuance to American democracy in
that institutional authority to say what the Constitution means is calibrated
to the level of consensus about what the Constitution means.1 22 The constraint on judicial authority increases when people agree about what the
Constitution means, or when they are united in rejecting the Court's interpretation of constitutional law.1 23 But, in the absence of such consensus,
judges can enforce interpretations of the Constitution that have support but
that might go unenforced in a government in which
authority to interpret
12 4
accountable.
held
readily
more
was
the Constitution
Whittington's normative conclusions are very close to the practices he
describes. 2 5 He assesses the regime from within: he explains why officials
might have constructed a regime characterized by judicial supremacy and
identifies benefits that might follow from their construction. 126 But he asserts that these are benefits without addressing the higher-order question of
what virtues should be exhibited in a democratic government and without
any real comparative analysis that would explain why we should favor an
institutional arrangement
characterized by judicial supremacy over alterna27
tive arrangements.
We find a similar perspective among many theorists who reject judicial supremacy. 28 They too assume judicial supremacy to be a characteristic of American constitutional democracy and associate the contest for authority to determine what the Constitution means with particular disagreements about constitutional doctrine.129 For example, Robert Bork and Mark
Tushnet, respectively, have proposed reforms to limit or eliminate judicial
review and do so based on an assessment of how judges will resolve important questions of constitutional law. 130
Larry Kramer also argues for political action to combat judicial supremacy but, in contrast to Bork and Tushnet, does so within the context of
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

supra note 112, at 293-96.
Id.
See id. at 49-81.
Id. at 293-96.
See generally id.
Id. at 28-82, 285-96.
See generally WHITI'NGTON, supra note 112.
See generally ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 96-119 (1996); RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE END OF
WHTrINGTON,

DEMOCRACY?: THE CELEBRATED FIRsT THINGS DEBATE wrrH ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON AND

"THE ANATOMY OF A CONTROVERSY" (Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE END OF
DEMOCRACY]; THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL, supra note 112; TUSHNET, supranote 39.
129.
See generally BORK, supra note 128, at 96-119; THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL, supra

note 112; THE END OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 128; TUSHNET, supra note 39.
130.
See BORK, supra note 128; TuSHNET, supra note 39.
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particular contests about constitutional meaning, rather than through institutional reforms. 131 He believes that we resolve the question of judicial supremacy through political action and contends that people should reclaim
from the Court the authority to say what the Constitution means. 1 2 Kramer,
however, says surprisingly little about why they should do it. Although he
associates judicial supremacy with the view that judges make better decisions than legislators and promote stability by resolving disputes with final-

ity,13 3 Kramer does not address these questions. 134 Indeed, he indicates that

they do not matter all that much because judicial supremacy's authority as a
normative construct depends on what citizens actually do: whether they
defer to the Court's understanding of the Constitution
or whether they force
35
people.1
the
of
authority
the
to
accede
to
Court
the
We have seen that theorists who consider judicial supremacy from an
internal perspective focus on the political interests that gain from judicial
supremacy and tend to assess judicial authority based on a prediction of
how judges will resolve salient issues of constitutional law. The question of
judicial supremacy, however, looks very different when we step outside the
practice of American constitutionalism. Most significantly, perhaps, we see
that judicial supremacy is an institution in need of justification.' 3 6 But the
external perspective also helps us answer the question of whether judicial
supremacy is justified. It allows us to focus on consequences of institutions
that follow from the nature of the institutional arrangements themselves, as
opposed to ephemeral considerations related to immediate debates about
constitutional doctrine, considerations that explain whether elected137officials
and citizens will help the Court to sustain controversial decisions.
C.

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY FROM AN EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVE

Because judicial supremacy characterizes American constitutionalism,
it would seem that it derives legitimacy because people approve of the prac131.
See generally KRAMER, supra note 39. Kramer associates judicial supremacy
with particular conditions of twentieth-century politics and argues that through most of our
history elected officials were more likely to assert their own authority to interpret the Constitution and, thus, played a greater role in the process that determines its meaning. Kramer
attributes its rise to: (1) a distrust of popular government that becomes heightened with the
rise of fascism, and (2) the need to preserve stability in a time of highly partisan conflicts.
See id at 8, 188-89, 222, 234-36.
132.
Id at 246-47.
133.
Id at 188-89, 222, 234-36.
134.
Id at 227-48. Instead, he suggests that judicial supremacy needs special justification because popular constitutionalism is more consistent with our republican commitments. Id.
135.
KRAMER, supra note 39, at 241-48.
136.
See infra text accompanying notes 138-48.
137.
See infra text accompanying notes 138-48.
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tice, even if they have never consented to it. But that is not the case. As
Whittington makes clear, the Constitution leaves the nature and scope of
an open question, one that people continue to contest pojudicial authority
13 8
litically.
What is more, Whittington's account suggests that it would be a mistake to interpret people's tolerance of judicial supremacy as approval of the
institution. 139 His story is one in which the people's representatives accede
to judicial supremacy as an expedient. 40 Elected officials support particular
decisions of the Court rather than supporting judicial supremacy itself and
do so in order to escape accountability for votes they believe would alienate
important constituencies. 41 For example, Whittington describes how President Clinton signed a bill that he believed was in tension with principles of
free speech and then relied on the Court to take whatever heat would come
from enforcing those principles. 142 Also, southern politicians increased the
authority of judges to enforce New Deal commitments and also attacked
whether or not
those judges for defining civil rights for African Americans,
143
question.
in
rights
the
supported
themselves
the officials
As a consequence, it would be wrong to say that either the people or
their representatives support judicial supremacy itself. They, at most, help
the Court to sustain particular decisions because of the substance of those
decisions, and they do so to secure political outcomes that could not be
gained through legislation. This would suggest that judicial supremacy not
only lacks the consent of the people but also rests on a foundation of judicial decisions that could not gain sufficient support through majoritarian
political processes. 144
The Constitution leaves open the question of who has authority to resolve disagreements about constitutional doctrine. But when the American
people are divided about the meaning of their constitutional commitments,
See WHrrINGTON, supra note 112, at 25-27.
138.
139.
Id. at 152-57.
140.
Id. at 82-229.
141.
Id. at 134-52, 195-210.
142.
Id. at 208-10.
Id. at 144-52. Whittington illustrates how the Court's leadership on civil rights
143.
"allowed legislatures to play to their individual constituencies by either directing blame at
the Court or lining up with it." WH1rrTNGTON, supra note 112, at 149.
144.
Note that this is not an argument against judicial supremacy; it only claims that
judicial supremacy cannot claim authority as an expression of the people's will. And Whittington would recognize this. He does not claim that judicial supremacy has popular support
or that we make American constitutionalism more democratic when we allow institutions to
compete politically for the authority to resolve disagreements about the Constitution.
WHITTNGTON, supra note 112. Whittington, instead, suggests that there is a virtue in supplementing democracy with a nondemocratic institution, one that can make decisions that
could not be attained through a process that is more responsive to majorities. I
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judges enjoy significant political supports that help them to sustain controversial interpretations of constitutional law. These supports give judicial
decisions something like a presumption of authority. 145 It is not surprising
then that many opponents of judicial supremacy seem to be motivated by
ideological considerations or encourage challenges to particular decisions. 146 In assessing their claims, we must ask whether such a presumption
of authority is justified.
There are at least two ways that an external perspective might help us
consider the question of judicial supremacy. The first is familiar; we might
ask whether judicial supremacy will advance an attractive conception of
justice as defined from an external perspective. 47 This approach suggests a
division of labor between philosophers who identify principles of justice
and political scientists who focus on the tendencies of different institutional
arrangements to determine whether they are likely to advance those principles. 148
However, the external perspective helps us to address the question of
judicial supremacy in a second way, one that has the potential to reinvigorate debates in constitutional theory. Whittington illustrates how, from an
internal perspective, judicial supremacy is inextricably linked to controversial interpretations of constitutional law, which in today's political climate
are often related to issues such as abortion, gay rights, and the meaning of
the Establishment Clause.1 49 By removing ourselves from political competition, the external perspective allows us to consider15 questions of institutional
authority in isolation from such hot-button issues. 0
145.
See Ward, supra note 113.
146.
See supra note 128.
147.
This is the approach that Walzer criticized, an approach that I have associated
with debates about the countermajoritarian difficulty. See supra text accompanying notes 2127.
148.
Martin Shapiro, PoliticalJurisprudence,Public Law, and Post Consequentialist
Ethics: Comment on ProfessorsBarber and Smith, 3 STUD. AM. DEV. 89 (1989). It also is
reminiscent of the type of constitutional theory that Walzer criticized. Walzer, however,
argued that philosophy should not intrude in the political process and suggested that philosophical considerations should influence political deliberations about the best institutional
arrangement. Walzer, supra note 6.
149.
WHITINGTON, supra note 112.
150.
In so doing, we identify structural arguments that are similar to Levinson's
attempt to bracket controversial questions of constitutional doctrine, but these arguments
consider constitutional structure from an external perspective. LEvINSON, supra note 1. The
change in perspective is important because it allows us to clarify how claims about structure
relate to claims about substantive justice.
We have seen that Levinson's structural argument masks a contested claim
about justice, one that is associated with interests that people seek to advance politically.
LEVINSON, supra note 1. This creates two problems: (1) it seems that his argument is intended to advance political interests associated with a controversial view of justice, and (2)
people will contest Levinson's call for a constitutional convention because they believe that
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Consider, for example, Alexander and Schauer's defense of judicial
supremacy. 151 They argue that judges perform an important settlement function, and their claim does not depend on how judges interpret the Constitution or whether judicial decisions are likely to advance justice.152 Similarly,
Jeremy Waldron argues against judicial supremacy because he believes that
the legislative process, in contrast with the judicial process, treats people
with equal concern and respect.1 53 His argument goes to the nature of the
legislative process; it is a claim about how the process functions
without
54
regard to the substance of laws that legislators might pass.
These arguments focus on the nature of institutions, rather than the
conflicts about justice that tend to overwhelm discussion when institutional
authority is contested politically. They take on greater importance because
political contests for authority tend to become proxies for fights about what
people want institutions to do with that authority. We have seen, for example, that judicial supremacy follows from a political settlement that is sustained by ephemeral considerations of how judges and elected officials resolve constitutional issues at particular points in time-considerations
hav55
ing nothing to do with the nature of the institutions themselves.
Indeed, Waldron rejects judicial supremacy because he believes its
justification depends on contested claims about justice. 156 His argument
turns on a distinction between the process that we-a collective-should
use to settle our disagreements about justice and the substantive values that
I-an individual-believe should guide the Court or other institution that
their interests would be hurt by the reforms Levinson suggests. See discussion supra Part
II.A.
Note that any structural argument will face the second problem; people will contest institutional reforms that they believe work against their interests, regardless of whether
those reforms do in fact work against their interests. They would also contest reforms that
might advance their interests if they thought it would put at risk a status quo that they believe is favorable to their interests. We, however, can frame structural arguments that address the first problem. It is possible to justify institutional arrangements based on reasons
having nothing to do with the interests or conceptions of justice we would like those institutions to advance.
This is not to say that such justifications are neutral. The authority might be
prone to advance some interests over others, which is why people would contest it. Nonetheless, the justification itself does not depend on certain interests being advanced at the expense of others, as was the case when Levinson sought to make it easier to legislate in the
name of progressive legislation. LEviNSON, supra note 1.
151.
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
152.
Id. at 1359.
153.
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 3-4, 7, 159-61 (1999).
154.
See Kenneth D. Ward, The Politics of Disagreement, 65 REv. POL. 425, 433-40
(2003).
155.
See supra Part II.B.
156. See WALDRON, supra note 153.
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resolves these disagreements. 157 Waldron believes constitutional theory
should address the question of how to respond to disagreements about justice as opposed to the substantive question of what justice requires. 158 And
he contends that we must justify the institutional arrangements that resolve
these disagreements without reference to the substantive values that are the
subject of the disagreements themselves.15 9
Waldron justifies legislative authority to resolve disagreements about
constitutional law based on considerations that do not prejudge those disagreements. 160 He believes that legislatures, by their nature, allow every
161
view a chance to be heard and every person an equal vote in the process.
In so doing, they advance a procedural ideal of equality and advance this
ideal no matter how they resolve particular issues of substantive justice.
The legislative process, according to Waldron, advances a norm of equality,
even though one legislature might pass a law that redistributes wealth
another might pass laws that promote great discrepancies in
broadly16while
2
wealth.

This is not to say that the legislative process operates in the way that
Waldron envisions. 163 Moreover, even if this were the case, it might also be
true that judicial supremacy can be grounded in considerations that have
nothing to do with the substance of the cases that judges must decide. Indeed, we have seen that Alexander and Schauer give us such an argument. 164 Waldron, however, makes a powerful argument that we should
that are not rejustify institutional arrangements based on considerations 65
lated to the substantive questions those institutions resolve. 1
This is not the place to assess Waldron's argument. 166 For now, we
only note that such an assessment is difficult when we situate the question
of institutional authority within broader political fights to resolve questions
of constitutional interpretation. More generally, we have seen that this internal perspective distracts attention from considerations that follow from

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See id.
See id. at 191.
See id. at 3-4, 7, 159-61.
See Ward, supra note 154.
See WALDRON, supra note 153, at 3-4, 7, 159-61.
See Ward, supra note 104.
Keith E. Whittington, In Defense of Legislatures, 28 POL. THEORY 690 (2000)
(reviewing JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (2001); JEREMY WALDRON, THE
DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999)).

164.
Alexander & Schauer, supra note 151.
165.
See WALDRON, supra note 153.
At a minimum, it depends on contestable assumptions about the purpose of
166.
political association.
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the nature of different institutional arrangements
that might be relevant to
167
the justification of those arrangements.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Constitutional theorists turned to politics as they recognized that philosophical arguments could not resolve the disagreements about the substantive issues that divide citizens. They put these disagreements to the side
by focusing on the institutional arrangements that resolve such questionsinstitutional arrangements that represent the authority of the American people. But these theorists bracket higher order normative questions about the
nature of democracy, and these questions seem to be as divisive as the questions of substantive justice that sparked the turn to politics. Indeed, disagreements about the nature of democracy undermine Levinson' s attempt to
168
build consensus for constitutional reform.
The difficulty of these disagreements becomes apparent from the external perspective that characterizes philosophy. As Walzer notes, philosophers consider normative questions unconstrained by the understandings
and conventions of their community. 169 They assess American constitutionalism without assuming the authority of the political institutions they examine and without preconceived notions of the interests those institutions
should advance. It is not surprising then that this external perspective helps
us to identify disagreements about what American democracy should be.
The question remains, however, whether philosophy can help us to resolve
these disagreements. That is a question best left to another essay.

167.
See supra text accompanying notes 117-28.
168.
See supra Part I.A. His failure is reminiscent of Ely's earlier failure to resolve
the countermajoritarian difficulty by having judges enforce values that define American
democracy. See supra note 34.
169.
See Walzer, supra note 6, at 396-97.

